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Preface

Spelling has been retained as found in contemporary sources.

Dissatisfaction with English monarchy resulted in civil war and
victory for the forces opposed to the royalists. Rather than forming a
decisive conclusion, the triumph of the New Model Army was a prelude to a
period of conflict and confusion. Those who acted against the King wanted a
new system of government, but there was little agreement as to the form it
should take. Between 1646 and 1649, individuals advocating democratic
changes in the political system, referred to as Levellers by their enemies,
organized, and influenced political events. In order to understand the
Levellers' rise to prominence and later failure to lead events, one must
analyze their political theories in relation to the harsh realities of politics.
Their politics were radical for the time, but they failed to achieve power
because, as a faction, their success depended upon other groups.
Unfortunately, for the fledgling democratic organization, power
remained the dominant factor needed for political success. Parliament and
the Army maneuvered for control of the government; in order for the
Levellers' program to be accepted, an alliance with the victor was necessary.
Though influential and invaluable to the Army at critical moments, Cromwell
and Ireton viewed the Levellers as a tool to intimidate the Parliament and
control the radical army ranks. Because their success depended on the
policies of the Army and the Parliament, the Levellers must be evaluated in
that context.
The Levellers advocated extending the franchise, freedom of religion,
separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial roles of government and
other reforms considered radical. By supporting policies which extended
liberty, provided freedom for individuals, and subordinated the monarch to
popular authority, the Levellers earned the right to be called England's first
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democratic political party. I In 1647, a party organization existed which had
developed from a base of dedicated individual crusaders. john Lilburne led
the party, and was the first of the Levellers to be known for out-spoken
criticism of the English governmental system.
The Levellers. at the height of their power, advocated a governmental
system which would function by approval of the English people. Rights of
the individual meant everything to Lilburne. who had been persecuted by
Parliament. In the late 1630s, Lilburne began an active career as a writer
and publisher of pamphlets proclaiming his martyrdom. and attacking the
government forces he deemed responsible for his persecution. Lilburne
might appear as an insignificant radical voicing personal complaints, but he
used his life as a vehicle for explaining the sufferings of England. In his
tract, A Worke of the Beast. Lilburne detailed his hearing before the Star
Chamber and the punishment he received. Emotional language described
Lilburne's suffering: "But I must confesse, if I had had no more but my owne
naturaU strength, I had suncke under the burden of my punishement, for to
the flesh the paine was very grevious..."2 Lilb urne made his story relevant
to all English people by declaring that the er ofJYcio oath, which he refused
to take, violated,"... the Petition of Right. ..(and) the Law of God."3 Personal
experience, complimented by a knowledge of Sir Edward Coke's work, and
religious issues contributed to Lilburne's theory of justice.
I G. E. Aylmer, ed., The Levellers in the Enalish Revolution. Urhaca: Cornell University
Press, 1975), p. 9. A discription of the party nature of the Levellers is found in Fener
Brockway, Britian'sFirstSociaJists. (New York: OuartetBoots.1980). p. 61.
Characteristic of political parties, members of the organization paid dues which varied
according to income. The Levellers were organized on the local level. The local unit,
which operated form taverns, elected representatives to district committees. From the
district level commissioners were selected to determine party politics.
2 William Haller, Tracts On Liberty In The Puritan Reyolution,vol.ll, (New York:
Octagon Books Inc., 196~n. A !Yorke oftile 1JtJast.1638, by john Lilburn e. p. 8.
3 ibid, p. 15.
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In T.!Je Worl:eoft/JeBeast, Lilburne presented himself as a martyr,
and appealed to God for justice. In his early debates, Lilburne focused on
religious issues as they related to personal freedom. Mystical experience,
with its emphasis on the individual and God's intimacy with people,
influenced Lilburne. He read Fo:xe's Book ofMartyrs and works by Luther
which were influenced by T.!Jeolouia tiermania. a continental mystical
writing.4 As a consequence of such influences, Lilburne believed in a
separation of church and state, and that true believers must quit the
established church and worship according to their own consciences in their
own congregations. Though his ideas about polity were radical, his theology
remained Calvinist until his Quaker conversion.5 Religion and politics were
intertwined in the 1640s; concern for religious freedom united the Levellers
in the initial stages of their group's development, and remained an issue of
central importance.
Dedication to religious freedom led Lilburne into secular battles, as he
found human liberty depended on a cooperative government. Lilburne's, "...
active faith ... became a source of power to challenge political tyranny, a vital
impulse toward democracy.''6 Criticism of the monarchy and a system of
government which ignored most individuals developed during the reign of
james I. Lilburne read Coke's Institutes, and believed that Magna Carta
secured the rights of the people.? By 1646, Presbyterians dominated
4 D. B. Robertson, Reliaious Foundations of Leveller Democracy. (New York: King's
Crown Press, 1951), pp.18-19.
5 Aylmer, p. 15.
6 Robertson, p. 22.
7 Sir Edward Coke challenged jame I's authority on legal issues, and maintained that
judical affairs were the business of trained judges and not a king. For Coke, and the
common lawyers, law was immemorial, and, therefore beyond the control of the King.
Coke was challeged by those, such as Sir Henry Spelman, who maintained England's
feudaJ history determined the country's development. Spelman's analysis discedits

Parliament. Lilburne did not accept the Presbytery system because it called
for a centrally controlled church and it denied the individualism that the
Congregational church allowed.
Emotional and stubborn at times, Lilburne needed a party organization
with people able to balance his personality, and add to his ideas. In 1645.
Lilburne was required to appear before a Parliamentary Committee on
Examination's to answer charges. Lilburne refused to do so before being
informed of the reason for his detainment. He maintained that he had, "... as
true a right to all the privileges that do belong to a freeman as the greatest
man in England whatsoever he be, whether Lord or Commoner, and
foundation of my freedome I bulkd upon the grand Charter of England ..."8
By using his own problem to address the larger issue. other radicals were
able to identify with Lilburne: "The loose organization that grew into the
leveller party arose largely in response to Lilburne's present 'martyrdom' in
the cause of politicalliberty.''9 The core group that developed had qualities
of organization, tact, intelligence and emotional appeal. In combination,
these qualities enabled the Leveller leaders to establish a program, publish
extensively, and develop a network of supporters.
William Walwyn and Richard Overton joined Lilburne to lead the
Levellers. Walwyn's attacks on the government and church system were
subtle, yet stinging. Because he refrained from overly emotional prose, he
attained a reputation of respectability which distressed Leveller
opponents. to Perhaps the most radical of the Levellers, Walwyn's Humble
Coke's arguments. J. G. A. Pocock. The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law. (New
York: Cambridge University Press.1987). pp. 63-69, 119-123.
8 joseph Frank. The Levellers, (New York: Russell & Russell. 1969), p. 57.
9 ibid
tO Aylmer, pp.lS-19
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Petition of the Brownists( 1641) pleas for religious liberty as a necessity for
a good political state. II The Power oflove, written in 1643, uses a religious
context to argue for individual liberty. Because God, "... made man
righteous ...and naturally a rationall creature, judging rightly of all things ...",t2
Walwyn maintained, people should have the freedom to use their rationality.
Overton advocated a reform program which included free education, a
national hospital plan and the return of lands which had been enclosed.
Such ideas made OVerton the most socialist of the Levellers.l3 OVerton, as
well as Walwyn. cautioned Lilburne not to over-use Magna Carta as
argumenlt4 Although the Stationers Company held a monopoly on the
publishing rights for all of England, OVerton successfully maintained a secret
press. and published many of the Levellers' pamphlets.t5
The Levellers came together as an organization in 1647, but they
could not implement their ideas because they did not control the
government. In fact, Lilburne spent most of his career as a Leveller in jail
for refusing to cooperate with the Long Parliament. The Levellers wanted
the war to be a revolutionary movement, as opposed to a reform. The
Presbyterians, who controlled Parliament in 1646, had a political agenda,
and represented a religious polity, contrary to the Levellers' plan.
Parliament was divided using terms of religious preference: Presbyterian
and Independent. However, in 1646 these names signified political
II Frank, p. 29-33.Walwyn was a successful cloth merchant. and lived an upper-middleclass life. Avery religious man, Walwyn began writing pamphets supporting religious
liberty.
12 Haller, Tracts On Uberty In The Puritan Revolution 1638-l6i7. vol.ll, William
Walwyn, T.lle Poreroflove. pp. 279-280.
l3 Aylmer, 82.
14 Derek Hirst, Authority and Conflict: En eland. 1603-1638. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1986), p. 274.
15 Frank, p. 53.

6
preferences more than religious divisions. The Presbyterians were
conservative and preferred that the civil war not go too far; they feared a
restructuring of the social order. Independents "...wanted an aU-out war
fought to a decisive conclusion."t6 The Independent leaders of the New
Model Army commissioned officers on the basis on merit, and rewarded
excellence; traditional policies of recognition due to social position were
abandoned in order to win the war. Religious toleration was also part of the
Army's policy.t7
The Leveller plan, immediately following the King's surrender at
Oxford, called for the House of Commons to assume its "rightful" role as a
representative of the people. Between 1646 and 1649, the Levellers
fluctuated between Parliament and the Army in an attempt to determine
which organization would support its goals. In March of 1647. the Levellers
submitted the 'Large Petition' to the House of Commons. At the same time
the petition was submitted, the Levellers were gaining support among
members of the Army, and tension was developing between Parliament and
the Army. It is possible that the Levellers submitted the petition knowing it
would be rejected, thereby further alienating the Army and pushing it to the
left.J8 However, because the Levellers later attempted to negotiate with the
House of Commons, following disillusionment with the Army, there is reason
to argue that the 'Large Petition' was submitted with a sincere, if unrealistic,
expectation that it would be adopted.
Though not yet recognized as an organization, the Levellers' 'Large
Petition' was the first collaborative effort among the movement's leaders.
16 Christopher Hill. The Centurv of Revolution 1603-lZJi. (New York: WWNorton &

Company, 1980), p. 108.
17 ibid, pp.lOZ-109.
18 Frank, pp.ll1-ll6.
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The Long Parliament was praised for its past accomplishments. but a sense
of urgency was conveyed. as the petition required that Parliament continue
its duty to reform. The abolishment of the episcopacy and ship money was a
good start, but:
Wee still find the Nation oppressed with grievances of the same
destructive nature as formerly though under other notions, and
which are so much the more grievous unto us, because they are
inflicted in the very time of this present Parliament [under God)
the hope of the oppressed;..."l9
Monopolies, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, the unreformed legal
system, and the poor conditions of prisons were among the targets of
criticism. The Levellers stressed that the time had arrived to frame a
settlement for the people:
...observing that you are now drawing the great and weighty
affaires of this Nation to some conclusion, and fearing that ere
long you may be induced to lay by you strength, which under
God hath hitherto made you powerfull to all good works...the
people, who have chosen and trusted you will seriously consider
that the end of your trust was freedome and deliverance from
all kind of grievances and oppressions.20
The conservative Parliament had no use for the Levellers, and, therefore,
rejected the petition. During the time of its consideration Parliament and the
Army began a struggle which ended with Pride's Purge.
After the King's surrender, the Presbyterians attempted to disband
the Army. The ranks responded unfavorably to suggestions that they fight
in Ireland without first being paid for services already rendered. According
to Clarendon, the Presbyterians regarded the Army as, "...their own...raised

l9Atymer, The 'Large Petition.' pp. 76-78.
20 ibid, pp. 78-79.
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and paid for by themselves ..."21 The Army disagreed. Initially, the ranks
cared primarily about their money; political theory was not a major concern
to the average soldier. In the spring of 1647, even a Presbyterian
settlement might have been accepted if the soldiers needs were considered.
But with the tax payers on strike, Parliament could not easily raise money.22
It was simpler to ignore the complaints, and plan for the disbandment.
Parliament had reasons to assume it could control the Army. The New
Model Army had broken from the practice of rewarding the rich with
commissions, but the regiments still functioned under traditional military
discipline. Furthermore, the Army was not independent from Parliament
during the war; the Committee of Both Kingdoms, composed of the Lords
denied their commissions by the Self-Denying Ordinance and Scotsmen,
controlled the Army. However, by the spring of 1647, the Army was
experiencing change. The junior officers obedient to Parliament went to
Ireland, leaving behind the radicals.23 Most importantly, Leveller pamphlets
circulated within the ranks.
In response the Parliament's refusal to negotiate with the Army, each
regiment elected two representatives from the ranks; these men were called
Agitators.21 The Levellers contributed to the Agitators' enthusiasm for
questioning Parliament's authority; however, the Levellers did not plan the
Agitators' formation, or tell them how to proceed. Their relationship was
solid because it was based upon common interest. Liberty of conscience
21 Edward. Earl of Clarendon. W. Dunn .Macray. ed., The Historv QfThe Rebellion And
Civil Wars In Ensland, voJ. IV, Books IX-XI. (Oxford: At The Clarendon Press,l958), p.
235.
22 Hirst, p. 270. Hirst cites 200,000 pounds as the amount needed to satisfy the soldiers.
23 Mart Kishlans.ty, "The Case Of The Army Truly Stated: The Creation of The New Model
Army," Past and Present81 (November 1978): 55-7-f.
21Austin Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 61.
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topped the list of Agitator concerns, after arrears of pay.25 Most
significantly, the Agitator movement was democratic in nature, which
coincided with the Levellers' ideas. The Agitators were elected by the ranks;
they were not appointed by the officers. Indeed, the officers followed the
lead of the ranks, once the power of the movement was understood. As the
common men of the Army demanded their rights, the Levellers realized that
the Army's concerns could led to a revolution in government.
At the time of the Agitator elections the radicals in the Army faced an
uncertain situation. just as the Levellers were powerless to act alone, the
ranks working against Parliament, royalist sympathizers, and the Army
officers could not succeed. Parliament planned to disband the Army on june
the first, but the day before the disbandment was to occur, two regiments
mutinied. This action demonstrated that the men of the Army would not be
ignored, and Parliament conceded to form a committee to meet with a
committee from the Army. Rather than improving the position of
Parliament, the concession encouraged the ranks and shifted the position of
the officers: "And now the army thought itself upon a level with the
Parliament...which likewise raised the spirit of Fayrefai ..."26 With the
Parliament on the defensive, the ranks claiming the rights of a democracy,
and the officers falling in behind the men, the Levellers believed they had
found the organization to champion their ideas.
Clarendon termed the Agitators Cromwell's "creatures," and
maintained that Cromwell directed Agitator action.27

As a royalist,

Clarendon thought the worst of Cromwell, and viewed his later actions as
2.5 A. S. P. Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism And Liberty. (Chicago: The University Of Chicago
Press, 1950 pp. 21-23.
26 Clarendon, p. 222.
27 Clarendon, p. 123.
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part of a grand plan. However, there is reason to believe the high ranking
officers of the Army weighed their options before siding with the ranks in
the summer of 1647. A letter written to Fairfax from the Agitators on May

29 urged him to support and organize a rendezvous of the Army to discuss
Parliament's plan, so that they, "...should not be deny'd to be judged before
our Disbanding Considering also the strange, unheard of, and unusual way of
Disbanding us apart, one Regiment from another, contrary to the Example of
other Armies Disbanded in this Kingdom;"28 Fairfax and Cromwell did not
care for the Agitators' appeals to justice or precedent. Theory meant little to
military commanders concerned with maintaining power. As Rushworth
commented: "...it was thought there was a necessity for the Officers to
comply with the Soldiers, who, as indeed was intimated, would have a

Hendewous without their Officers which would be tumultuous and of
dangerous Consequence, to Spoil of the Country, and destructive to the
Kingdom."29 The officers decided to support the ranks for practical reasons,
thus moving toward the left, where the Levellers waited with a platform.
During the summer of 1647, traditional ideas of order were
challenged. Many documents claiming rights for the Army and the nation
were published; however, one incident best exemplifies the challenges to the
hierarchy. By weakening the opposition, the Agitators would be in a better
position to act, and enlist officer support. Though defeated in the war,
Charles remained active, and attempted to make beneficial alliances. The
Presbyterians planned to use Charles to form an alliance with the Scottish

28 john Rushworth, ed, Historical Collections. vol. VI, part IV, (Oxford, 1721), p. <i98.
29 ibid Rushworth's italics
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army against the New Model Army.30 Charles represented a threat to some,
a tool to others.
Cornet joyce refused to let Charles disrupt the work of the Army.
Acting on his own accord, joyce, with a handful of men. took Clarles from the
control of Parliament to an Army camp.31

When Charles asked by what

authority joyce acted, "joyce answered, 'By this;' and shewed them his
pisto1;"32

One of the lowest commissioned officers in the Army acted to

change the system. Cromwell probably knew of joyce's mission, as they had
talked on May 29, but it originated from the planning center of the
Agitators. Distressed to learn of the action, Fairfax instructed a colonel to
relieve joyce of controf.33

Although Fairfax disaproved of joyce's actions.

Charles was not returned to Parliament. The incident demonstrated that
protocol was diminishing, and that the ranks could influence Army policies.
Having the King under control, the Parliament on the defensive, and
the ranks seething with anger, Ireton issued A Representation Of' The
ArmF.'~

The petition, issued on june 14, legitimatized the officers' support

for the ranks. As well as being a politically calculated move by the officers,
the Representation stated a philosophy with which the Levellers identified.
Before disbanding, the Army demanded satisfaction for themselves and the
kingdom, "...Especially considering that we were not a mere mercenary army,
hired to serve any arbitary power of a state, but called forth and conjured

30 Christopher Hill, God's Englishman. (New Yort: The Dial Press, 1970), p. 88.

31 Charles had been under house arrest, guarded by Parliament's soldiers.
32ibid, p. 225.
33 Hill, God's Enalishmu. pp. 88-89.
34 A general in the New Model Army, Ireton became Cromwell's brother-in-law. Ireton
played a major role in determining Army policy during these critical years. At times,
when Cromwell remained indecisive, Ireton continued with policies to advance the
Army's interests.
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by the several declarations of Parliament to the defence of our own and the
people's just rights and liberties."35

The Army denied that it was

subordinate to Parliament, because it fought for the people. A mission of
justice did not deserve to be soiled by unthinking bureaucrats.
just as Parliament was confronted in the 'Large Petition' to support
the rights of the people, Overton in An Appea/e from the Oegenerate
Representative Body of the Commons ofE.ngl811d Assembled at Westminster

turned to the New Model Army as the savior of the people. The
radicalization of the Army encouraged the Levellers to switch their support
from Parliament. Overton admitted that there were no precedents for direct
action by the people; however, he maintained that in desperate times the
law must give way to equity.36 The Appea/eand 'Certain Articles,' a
postscript to the document, made a formal break from the Long Parliament.
Ireton's Representation demanded to know by what authority the
Parliament unjustly governed the Army. Overton stated that the Parliament,
not elected by the people, had no right to office: "...the Assembly of the
Parliament, contrary to , and without the free choice and Election of the
People, ... may be removed from sitting therein."37 A simplified, just legal
system, free education and a national hospital plan were Overton's
expectations of a democratic England.38

The Levellers supported the Army

with this proposal, but the extent to which the officers supported the
Levellers remained uncertain.
The most significant document published in the summer of 1647,
illustrating the Levellers' position on Parliament and the Army, was The Case
35 Woodhouse. F.rom A Represenl8t.io11 OfT.IJe Army. p. 404.
36 Frank. pp. 1~-127.
37Alymer, 'Certain Articles,' p. 85.
38 ibid. pp. 8+-86.
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of the Armie Truly Stated. Both the problems of the Army and the nation

were addressed, as the Levellers sought to gain the Army's support and
demonstrate their authority on the issues at hand. The first section of the
document stated that Army's problems had not been addressed. Much of the
Hepresentalion was restated, as the Case justified the Army's grievances. If

the problems remained unresolved, the people would stop supporting the
Army. With no money to buy food, the Army would become a burden on the
people and be perceived as the enemy.39

As with most Leveller

documents, the Case used an issue: the Army's problems, which related to a
larger issue: the needs of the people. Speaking for the Army, the Case
stated: "...that we minded not our own interest, but the good, freedome, and
welfare of the whole Nation. "-tO

Parliament, the bane of the Army, if

elected by the people, would benefit the entire nation. In addition, the
Levellers attacked monopolies, taxes, the legal system, and the common
prayer book.-tl
The Levellers stated the Army's case without its permission. Three
days before the Case was submitted to Parliament, a letter was sent to
Fairfax justifying Leveller activity in Army business. They maintained that
in order to achieve justice and God's plan, Fairfax would, "...not think it
strange, or judge [the authors] disobedient or refractory, that we should, as
we have presumed, State the Case of the Army,"-t2 In this way, the
Levellers showed that the issue of Parliamentary right affected every
English person and not just the soldiers. The Levellers justified their role in
39 William Haller and Godfrey Davies, eds.,The Leveller Tracts l6fl-1653. (New York:
Co1umbjaPress,1944), pp. 65-71.
-10 1'b'd
1 • p. n .
... ibid, pp. n-M.
42 Rushworth, p. 8.f5 vot. VII part IV
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Army affairs as a personal responsibility; failure to act at such a critical time
would be inexcusable: "If our Duty bind us when we see our Neighbour's
House on fire, to wave all Forms, Ceremonies, or Complements ...""i3
Reformation ideas of responsibility and equality are used in their
argument.
The relationship between the Agitators and the Levellers strengthen
as the Levellers supported their cause. Frank asserts:
The Case of the .Army, itself the result of active collaboration

between the Leveller and soldier, was thus the wedge by which
Lilburne, Walwyn, and Overton finally entered those councils
where national policy was actually determined. For a moment
the Levellers stood on the threshold of political power .<f4
Indeed, the officers could not ignore an organization which had a strong hold
on the ranks. Fairfax's response to the letter was neither positive nor
negative; he thought the matter should be presented to the General
Councif.45
The Levellers failed to achieve an alliance with the Army's leadership
at the Putney debates. An invitation to talk with the Army was not an
endorsement of Leveller policy. Cromwell distrusted the Levellers, and
Lilburne suspected Cromwell had no intention to implement Leveller policy.
As an Army leader, and the future ruler of England, Cromwell's actions had a
direct effect on the success of the Leveller movement. Gooch maintains that
an evaluation of Cromwell's actions and motives, after 1646, as either
cunningly designed to secure the kingdom for his personal rule, or as sincere

43 ibid, p. 846.
44 Frank, p. 13-f.

<f5 The General Council of the Army was composed of officers and Agitators.
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and open. provides a limited analysis of a complex individuat.46 Abbott
defends Cromwell from attacks of hypocrisy. by describing Cromwell's
motives as thoses of a practical politician. In an effort to balance factions.
Cromwell acted as circumstances demanded to maintain his influence.47
Though his actions can be rationalized as practical, he made few friends and
was loathed by both royalists and radicals.
Cromwell feared growing Leveller influence in the ranks; he supported
the rank's demands to counter-balance radical appeals, because he needed
the Army to defeat the Presbyterians, whom he disliked for their religious
intolerance. He shared many of the Levellers' concerns, but supported few
of their solutions.48 Cromwell's commission was not renewed in 1646. and it
was as a noninfluential member of Parliament that he talked with the troops
in May of 1647. Lilburne preferred that Cromwell remain out of Army
affairs, and, upon his return, Lilburne attacked Cromwell. In the months
before the Putney debate, Lilburne attempted to secure a release from
prison. Cromwell had influence among the Independents of Parliament, but
did little to help Lilburne. Enraged by Cromwell's actions, Lilburne stated
that the Agitators bad been corrupted by officers, specifically Cromwell and
Ireton.49 Even during times of negotiation, tension characterized the
relationship between the Levellers and the Army.
During the Putney debates, the difference of political philosophy
among members of the Army and Levellers became clear. Organized to

46 G.

P. Gooch, English Democratic Ideas In The Seventeenth Centurv. (Cambridge: At
The University Press, 1927), p. 192.
47 Wilbur Cortez AbboU. The Writinas and Speeches of Oliver CromyeU. vol. I. (New
York: Russell &Russell, 1970), pp. 463-46,.
48 Hill, God'sEnglishma,n, pp. 8'-88.
49 Frank, p. 130.
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address the Levellers' Agreement of the People and relevant issues of
policy, the debate centered on the franchise issue. Though the debate lacked
organization and focus, the people in attendance attempted to resolve issues
of political theory relevant to their situation. Focus was hard to achieve
because the debaters lacked philosophical unity. The participants attended
to discuss a document, but realized they needed criteria with which to
evaluate it.
Cromwell made it quite clear, during the meeting, that he favored
conservative reforms. In july, Cromwell had attempted to negotiate with the
King, claiming a role of mediator between Charles and Parliament. Cromwell
may well have, "...believed that the restoration of the monarchy was
essential to the stability of property and the social order."50 But more
importantly, Cromwell sought to control the heady events of the summer. If
working on the King's behalf gave him power, then that was considered solid
policy. The generals attempted to reach an agreement with the King based
on Ireton's Heads ofProposllls Charles cared little for deals, and used
Cromwell's advances as a means of stalling, with hopes that the Scots would
come to his rescue. At the same time the Heads received attention, the
Levellers presented their Apeement of lbe People as a just way of
organizing government.51
Very little of the Agreementof'lbe.People was discussed at Putney.
Perhaps the best statement of the Levellers' constitutional plan, the
Agreement

is often considered the political manifesto of the Levellers. Its

purpose, as stated in the preamble, was to protect freedom, avoid "returning

50 Hill, God'sEnalishman. p. 92.
51 ibid, pp. 92-94.
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to a slavish condition" and to avoid another civil war .52 The clauses that
follow explained the method by which such freedom and peace can be
secured. The first clause discussed the issue of rotten boroughs, but did not
call for complete manhood suffrage. The second clause demanded the
dissolution of the Long Parliament. Though technically a representative
body, its long rule caused "inconveniences."53 The third clause stated that
the people would chose the Parliament every two years.
The fourth clause of the Agreement made clear the power of the
people. Parliament's powers included: making and repealing laws;
establishing and abolishing offices and courts; and conducting foreign affairs.
Parliament has power, but it is subordinate to those who have elected it. An
important part of Leveller political philosophy is the democratic implication
of the phrase: "...this (the newly elected Parliament), and all future
Representatives of this Nation, is inferior only to theirs who chuse them ..."5"i
The Levellers did not want matters of religion to be controlled by the secular
world; freedom of conscience was a right of all. Impressment was declared
illegal; all people were subject to law regardless of their social position; and
all laws were to be just and for the benefit of the people. The Agreement
was addressed to the people of England, but the people never received it.
Cromwell and Ireton focused on the first clause, which they perceived
to advocate universal manhood suffrage. The Levellers faced accusations of
advocating communism, and leading the country to anarchy. Cromwell
believed that a society of order needed a hierarchy, such as that advocated
in Heads The monarchy would be retained with limited power, and
52 Almyer, An AK.rtJtJIIltiDtoftiJe.People, forafirmeudpreS8Dt.Pesce, upoD KrDUDdsof
CoJJUilOD-RiKilt. p. 89.
53 ibid, p. 90.
54 ibid
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Parliament would be biennial.55 The generals supported monarchy in
October, but, as Woodhouse notes: "... their attachment to monarchy was, like
their attachment to Parliament, less deeply grounded than the
'Presbyterians'; it was more a matter of policy than of principle."56 Though
Putney failed to evaluate the

Agreemen~

the discussion of issues addressed

the essence of Leveller theory. AU English subjects possessed rights, and
government was to function for the people.57
On October 28th and 29th at Putney, Cromwell and Ireton represented

the conservative side, advocating a limited extension of the franchise and
reforms that respected tradition. The Levellers and Agitators, represented
by Rainsborough, Petty, Wildman, and others, supported a more significant
extension of the franchise, and maintained that bad precedents deserved
abandonment. Ireton tried to dismiss the Agreement by acknowledging
that while some of it might be valid, the council had no right to adopt it. He
maintained that the Army could not break "engagements" already
established, even if justice was the cause. Only by sending the issue to
another committee, Ireton maintained, could it be settled.58 Cromwell feared
rash action at a time of great change; distrustful of Leveller ideas he judged
to be too theoretical, he argued for caution and the use of a committee. The
Levellers did not let the matter so easily die.

55 S. R. Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660.
(Oxford: At The Clarendon Press, 1906), T.IJe HIJ8dsofProposa/J; p. 316.
56 Woodhouse, p.17.
57 The Leveller movement was not an active feminist organization: however, it
advocated women's rights more than most groups at that time. The wives of the
Leveller leaders were polically active, and worked to advance their husband's goals. see
Woodhouse, Petit.io11 of Trome.D, .Affecl8rs 8./JdApprovers oftile Pet.it.io11, pp. 367-369.
58 Woodhouse, Putney Debates, pp.10-15. Of course, later, Ireton does break with
Parliament. His comments at the debate are meant to frustrate the Levellers, but it is
also probable that Ireton was still trying to resolve the issue for himself.
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The first part of the debate focused on natural rights, and the extent
to which circumstances justified breaking agreements. Wildman stated:
Parliament...though they make an unjust law though they make
an unrighteous law, yet we must swear obedience. I confess, to
me this principle is very dangerous, and I speak it the rather
because I see it spreading abroad in the Army again--whereas
it is contrary to what the Army first declared: that they stood
upon such principles of right and freedom, and Laws of Nature
and Nations ....59
In order to implement the Agreement of the People, the Levellers advocated
abandoning the unrepresentative Parliament, which they viewed as unjust
and not in keeping with natural law. The ideas expressed in the Agreement
were new, and radical to many. Cromwell and Ireton did not have a moral
problem with abandoning the Long Parliament, or making significant
changes in government, as just one month later Colonel Pride entered
Parliament. The Independent officers distrusted an appeal to natural law
which lacked definition and could lead to anarchy. Ireton stated:
If you will resort only to the Law of Nature, by the Law of
nature you have no more right to this land, or anything
else, than I have ...when I hear men speak of laying aside all
engagements to (consider only) that wild or vast notion of what
in every man's conception is just or unjust, I am afraid and do
tremble at the boundless and endless consequences of it...There
is a great deal of equivocation (as to] what is just and unjust.60

Philosophy was much to inexact for the military men preparing to take
action based on self-interest with the goal of control. A discussion of
natural rights led to the issue of property rights. Ireton feared a nation of

59 ibid, p. 24.
60 ibid, pp. 26-27.
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people demanding the property of the rich as part of their natural rights.
The Independent generals did not support drastic changes in social order.
After discussing the philosophical direction the nation should adopt,
on the second day, the debate shifted to specific questions of the franchise
issue. Ireton maintained that, "...no person hath a right to an interest or
share in the disposing of the affairs of the kingdom ...that hath not a
permanent fixed interest in this kingdom, .."6J Ireton continued to defend
his position by claiming that many people have influence over local
government; he discussed the of rights of foreigners, and maintained that
those without an interest in the nation should not control national
government.62 Rainsborough argued that to disenfranchise a man because
he lacked property contradicted God's law. Sexby relates Rainsborough's
argument to the case of soldiers. The poor soldiers fought to recover their
birthrights which were their interest in the kingdom. To deny the soldiers a
role in determining their government because they lack property, Sexby
stated, was to label them as mercenaries.63 Ireton's final position on the
issue was that property, a human creation, lay outside of God's law. and that
while, "...the original of power of making laws, of determining what shall be
law in the land, does lie in the people--(but by the people is meant those]
that are possessed of the permanent interest in the land."6-i Although the
Levellers stated their case eloquently during the debate, their arguments
failed to convince Cromwell, who maintained their ideas would lead to
anarchy.

61 ibid, pp. 53-5.f.
62 ibid, pp. '.f-57.
63 ibid, p. 69,
61 ibid, pp. 67-69.
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It is possible that the Levellers had not decided on the details of the
franchise issue, and were willing to compromise in order to reach an
agreement with Cromwell and Ireton. Petty was willing to accept a franchise
policy which excluded servants, apprentices and alm takers.65 However, the
details of the issue meant little to Cromwell. Ireton and Cromwell have been
accused of using the debate as a method of stalling the radicals. Indeed, the
debate was not well organized as the same themes were often repeated.66
On November 4, over the objections of Cromwell and Ireton, the General

Council of the Army voted to extend the franchise to all except servants and
beggars. However, the Agreement of the People never reached the common
people. Because the Agreement was not adopted by the powerful generals
of the Army, it faded into the background of events.
The General Council passed the suffrage agreement without the
support of Cromwell, and in a letter written to several regiments by
Agitators the resolution was stated: " That all soldiers 1111d others, ff they be
not servants or beggars, ought to have voices in electing those which shall
represent them in Parliament. although they have not forty shillings per
annum in freehold land'67 The Agitators stated the resolution in their own

terms, but it affected the Levellers as well. The General Council, dissolved
by the generals, was not allowed to continue with scheduled debates.
Cromwell feared that the Council would pass more resolutions contrary to his
plans. The Council had scheduled a general rendezvous of the entire Army.
However, Fairfax fear mutiny if the Army met as a whole. Therefore,
Fairfax arranged for the Army to meet in three separate groups. These
6' Christopher Thompson, "Muimilan Petty And The Putney Debate On The Franchise,"
Past & Present 88 (August 1980), pp. 63-68.

66woodhouse, p. 28.
67 ibid, A Letter from Several Agitators to their Regiments, p. 452.
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actions angered the Agitators who wrote to the soldiers: "...you may observe
the strange inconstancy of those that would obstruct our way, ...But we hope
it will be no discouragement to you, though your officers--yea, the greatest
officers--should oppose you."68 The conflicts between the Agitators and the
generals brought the Levellers and the soldiers to common ground.
Cromwell tried to control the Agitators by putting restrictions on their ability
to act, but this created more opposition to his authority. On November 11,
the day the Agitators sent the letter attacking the officers to the regiments,
an event occurred which hurt the Agitators' ability to rally the Army to their
program.
Charles' escape to the Isle of Wight enabled Cromwell to appeal to the
soldiers' sense of loyalty to the Army as a fighting unit. Unsure of the
location of the King and his immediate plans, many in the Army feared a
return to war. Dramatic occurrences focused attention on political realities,
and detracted from the Levellers' appeal to theories of justice. Cromwell
could not have hoped for a more timely crisis, and he has been accused of
organizing Charles' flight. There is little evidence to support the theory that
Cromwell arranged the escape; however, Cromwell's cousin, Robert
Hammond, commanded the island, and Cromwell visited the Isle between
September fourth and twelfth.69 Regardless of who helped Charles to Wight,
attention was diverted from the officers' problems at Putney. Writing to
Hammond, Cromwell expressed his optimism: "How good has God been to
dispose all to mercyl And although it was trouble for the present, yet glory
has come out of it;...But, dear Robin, this business hath been, I trust, a mighty

68 ibid. p. -455.
69 Hill, God's Englishman, pp. 96-98.
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providence to this poor Kingdom and to us all."70 The Second Civil War did
occur, but rather than a curse, it proved to be to Cromwell's advantage.
At Ware, one of the three rendezvous points of the Army on
November 16, the Levellers and Agitators attempted to lead the soldiers in
a mutiny against the officers. Rather than using the Army organization by
working with the officers, a direct appeal was made to the common soldiers.
At the heart of all Leveller philosophy, were the rights of the common
people to control their lives and influence the destiny of the nation. The
failure of the Ware mutiny demonstrated that the Levellers could not
succeed by appealing directly to the people, but rather needed to work with
those in power.
The failed mutiny succeeded in strengthening the generals' position.
In a letter written to the House of Commons, Fairfax explained the
occurrences of the mutiny. Colonel Eyre and Major Scot, two known
Agitators, "...had dispersed divers of those Papers amongst Col. Lilb urne
Regiment of Foot, athe most mutinous Regiment in the Army,..."? I In an
effort to get support and weaken the generals, the Agitators and Levellers
campaigned among the soldiers. Some soldiers, upon learning that Fairfax
did not support the Agreement, abandoned the Levellers:
Colonel Rainsborow and some others. presented a Petition and
the Agreement of the Peopl~ to his .E.rcellency, at his first
comming, Colonel Harrison's Regiment, who had Papers in their
Hats, witb this Motto, England's Freedo01, and Soldiers .Nights.
when they understood their Error, by the Generals severe
Reproof, of their so doing, tore them, and expressed their
Resolution to be obedient to his Excellency's Commands.72
70J'homas Carlyle. ed .• Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches. vol. 1, (New York:
Scribner. Welford &Co., 1870), p. 316
71 Rushworth, vol. VII, part. IV, p. 875.
72 ibid, p. 867.
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Of course not all soldiers fell in behind the officers, but those who did not
understand the philosophy of Leveller theory had little reason to disobey the
generals. Fairfax and Cromwell maintained control of the Army, and also
gave the Parliament cause to worry. In a letter written to Fairfax, the House
of Commons expressed their thanks for his role in quelling the disturbance,
and promised to find a satisfactory way to raise money for the Army.73
By December 1647, the initial hostility toward the generals, following
Putney, subsided as a result of common concerns. Charles began negotiations
with the Scots which threatened the success of both the Army and the
Levellers. Cromwell and Rainsborough agreed that, "(i)f the King and his
Scottish allies were to be opposed, it was only in the name of the existing
Parliament, whatever its demerits, that the battle could be fought, and to
gain that end, subsidiary questions must for the present be waived.''74 The
Agitators ceased to advocate mutiny, the Army council pardoned mutineers,
and Fairfax appointed Rainsborough to the post of Vice-Admiral, though the
Lords refused to consent. In addition to the external threat posed by the
Scots, English royalists demonstrated and published in support of a
restoration.75
Even with an alliance, the Levellers continued to distrust CromweU,
and view him as a, "dastardly time-server,'76 CromweU had supported the
monarchy when to do so served his needs, and in December he sided with
Parliament. The Putney Projects, a significant LeveUer tract written by
Wildman, accused Cromwell of hypocrisy. Whatever Cromwell's motivations,
73 ibid, p. 876.
74 S. R. Gardiner, History Qfihe Great Civil War 1642-1649. (New York: Longmans,
Green, And Co., 1893) p. 44.
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the Army easily defeated the Scottish force, and put down royalist revolts in
South Wales and Colchester. A new threat to Cromwell's control came as
Parliament attempted to negotiate with the King and make the Newport
Treaty.
The Presbyterians wanted to establish order in the name of a
weakened monarchy which they would control. Members of Parliament,
who disliked the Presbyterians' plans of religious organization, supported
resolving the conflicts in order to strengthen Parliament. Before such an
agreement could be reached, Parliament had to negotiate with the King and
be assured of his sincerity. Perhaps the more difficult task would be to
reach an agreement which the Army would accept.77 Cromwell found
unacceptable any treaty between the King and Parliament, which gave
Parliament authority over the affairs of state. In response to the threat
posed by such an alliance, the Army appealed to the Levellers for support,
and promised them a role in establishing a new form of government.
The Levellers ultimately agreed to support the Army in return for
negotiations, which Army leaders promised would adopt an agreement of the
people. However, they did so reluctantly, and after a final attempt to ally
themselves with the House of Commons failed. The Bloody Proj'ec~
submitted to Parliament in late August 1648, stated that if the King must be
restored so as to bring peace to England than it must be done, "speedily and
honorably."78 The pamphlet called for. "...the establishment of a progressive
and constitutional democracy in England ...(and) that any political coalition
formed to achieve this positive aim ought to be under the leadership of the

77 David Underdown, Pride's Purae. (Oxford: At The Clarendon Press, 1971 ), p. 105.
78 Frank, p. 166.
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Levellers."79 As long as the House of Commons had power and shared it with
the Levellers, the restoration of the King as a figure-head was acceptable.
In September, the Levellers submitted The Humble Petition, similar
to the 'Large Petition,' to the House of Commons. The petition appealed to
the Commons not to forsake their duty to the people. Believing that the Long
Parliament could still be the instrument of the Leveller program, the House
of Commons retained the faith of the Levellers: "...we judged this honorable
House chosen by, and representing the People..."80 The Commons was
praised for past achievement; however:
...no sooner God vouchsafeth you victory, and blesseth you with
success, and thereby enablet you to put us and the whole
Nation, into an absolute condition of freedom and safety: but
according as ye have bin accustomed, passing by the ruine of a
Nation, and all the bloud that hath bin spilt by the King and his
Party, ye betake your selvs to a Treaty with him, thereby
puting him that is but one single person, and a pub like Officer
of the Commonwealth, in competition with the whole body of
the people, whom ye represent; ..81
The restoration of the King threatened to be detrimental to the Levellers and
the House of Commons. Though not immediately rejected by the Commons,
the petition did not result in an alliance with the Levellers.
Cromwell convinced the Levellers that an alliance with the Army was
their only option. Indeed, the Levellers could not afford to be excluded from
the final outcome of the civil war. The Commons ignored their appeals and
continued negotiating with the King. The Levellers' role as a faction was
painfully apparent in months before Pride's Purge. Unable to settle the
79 ibid, pp. 166-167.
80 Alymer, T.IJe Bu.m!Jle Petitio11, p.132.
81
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affairs of the kingdom alone, the Levellers, reluctantly, consented to the
generals' plans, though serious doubts remained.
Before the Army asked for Leveller support, the officers needed to
agree on a plan of action. Ireton's Remonstrance called for descisive action
against the King and a purge of Parliament. Cromwell and Fairfax were less
anxious to abandon diplomatic channels, and supported a final attempt to
reach an agreement with the King. However, on November 18 the General
Council adopted Ireton's plan. On November 15 the Commons voted to allow
the King to come to London, and restore his lands and legal revenues.
Parliament was willing to compromise with Charles to frustrate the Army
and radicals, even though the King had not accepted the Treaty of Newport.82
Parliament meant to burn all bridges with the Army.
Ireton's Remonstrance provided a plan for dealing with Parliament,
the King, and establishing a new system of government. Leveller ideas were
included in the document in an attempt to attract them to the program;
however. the details. vague at points. were less democratic than the
Levellers desired.83 The .Kemonstrance stated that: "...nor without their
advice and consent may anything be imposed upon, or taken from, the
people;..."M The first part of the document provides a philosophical
justification for the specific recommendations of the second part. Parliament
was instructed to chose a time to dissolve and return power to the people.
Annual or biennial elections were to be held to assure a system of just
government. The details of the settlement were to be established by an
agreement of the people. The .Kemonstr1111ce closed by praising the 'Large
82 Underdown. pp. 11:~-122.
83 ibid, pp. 123-125.
84 Woodhouse, ARemonstrance ofFairfu and The Council of Officers, p. "58.
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Petition,· and challenging the Commons to act wisely.85 The Army advocated
some principles of government which the Levellers supported, and appealed
to the Commons in similar language as that of the 'Large Petition" and a

Humble Representation. However, the Army's motivation for writing the
Remonstrancewas not philosophical; the document was less of a plan, and
more of an apology for the action soon to be taken against the Parliament.
Viewing the Remonstrance as a tool of a policy already planned, the appeal
to the Levellers is easily seen as part of a limited plan and not a commitment
for future cooperation.
Not surprisingly, members of Parliament were outraged by the
document. William Prynne stated that: '"So far from being seasonalbe'...the

.Kemonstrance'was subversive of the law of the land', leading only to
'desolation and confusion'."86 The Army was ready to act, but the Levellers
remained skeptical. Ireton met with Lilburne and Wildman on 25 November
to discuss their differences. The Levellers rejected his stance on liberty of
conscience, which they found too strict, and disapproved of the power
Parliament was to retain in judicial cases.87 In addition to disagreeing with
details of Ireton's plan, the Levellers had no guarantees that the Army
would include them in a settlement of the nation's affairs after gaining
control. Lilburne wrote in his account of the negotiations:
And besides we plainly told him: we would not trust their bare
words in general only. for they had broke their promise once
already both with us and the kingdom. and he that would break
once would make no conscience of breaking twice if it served
for his ends, and therefore they must come to some absolute
85 ibid. pp. -162--164.
86 Underdown. p. 126.
87 Woodhouse. The History Of The Second Agreement. From john Ulburne, Legal
Fwu/8JJ1e.J118.1 li!Jerties, (1649). pp. 3«-345.
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particular compact with us. or else. some of us told him. we
would post away to London and stir up our interest against
him.88
Lilburne's statement was prophetic, but he had to risk betrayal. Ireton
confirmed the truth of Lilburne's words; however. he insisted that the Army
did not have time to reach a final agreement before settling affairs with
Parliament. If the Army delayed and a treaty was concluded between the
King and Parliament, the Army would, "... be commanded ...to disband ...And
then ...we shall never be able to fight with both the interest of King and
Parliament, so that you will be destroyed as well as we."89 As a faction,
with little independent power, the Levellers had no choice but to agree to
Ireton's terms. Opposing the Army, and hurting its base of support, could
result in a royalist victory. The generals wanted the Levellers' endorsement
in order to unify the ranks, and the Levellers had much to lose by not
backing the Army.
The Levellers proposed that a committee of sixteen draw up an
agreement for the people. Members of the committee would include: four of
the Army's "honest friends" from Parliament; four Levellers; four
Independents; and four members of the Army. The Levellers sought to
settle matters, and the committee would be a vehicle of cooperation and
commitment. Ireton enthusiastically accepted the plan, proclaiming it, "... as
just, 11s r111iooal, 110d11s equitllble,

liS possibly could bt!..9o

Ireton, happy

with the committee plan which placated the Levellers, wasted no time before
marching to London. The perceived urgency to purge the Parliament,
disrupted the committee's work.
88 ibid, pp. 345-346.
89 ibid, p. 346.
90 ibid, p. 347. quoted by Lilburne in the paper
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The formation of the committee gave the Levellers hope that an
agreement based on democratic ideals would be adopted by the Army. just
as the election of Agitators indicated the democratic tendencies of the ranks,
a committee approved by the generals showed a willingness to work with
the Levellers. However, after the purge, the Levellers were not treated as
members of a democratic process. Mter a slow beginning, Lilburne and the
remaining thirteen members of the committee drafted a new agreement of
the people. Ireton agreed that the work of the committee was to have been
the final form of the agreement. Much to the distress of the Levellers, the
committee's draft was submitted to the Council of Officers for review.9t
The Army dominated power politics after purging Parliament. Once in
control, Ireton did not need to worry about the Levellers' outcries. Issues
involving the second agreement were discussed at Whitehall; however, the
Army's agreement was published on December 15, just a day after the start
of the debates, which indicated the officers did not intend to negotiate.92
Lilburne expressed the Levellers' anger, and explained his view of the
Army's actions: "...they undertook merely to quiet and please us (like
children with rattles) till they had done their main work ...that so they might
have no opposition from us but that we might be lulled asleep in a fool's
paradise with thoughts of their honest intentions till all was over ..."93 On
December 1S, Lilburne published the original draft of the committee under
the name,

Foundations ofFreedom The Levellers continued to attack the

generals, and argue for the adoption of their program. However; the moment
of opportunity was gone. Regardless as to whether the Levellers were

91 Frank. p.175.
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manipulated, or allowed to fall into a trap they set for themselves, the party
no long functioned as a faction.
. The Levellers advocated a system based on democratic ideals in a
situation which was dominated by military superiority. Opponents of the
Levellers argued against their progressive notions. However, the Levellers'
radicalism paled in comparison to that to the Digger's and the Fifth Monarchy
Men. During the Putney debates, the conservatives in the Army tried to
equate the Leveller's democratic notions with communism. However, the
Leveller's did not favor agraian communism, and by 1648 Lilburne tried to
disassociate his program from that of the Digger's.91 The Fifth Monarchy
Men were a millenarian group, which maintained that the Civil War was a
struggle to establish the proper government in anticipation of the Second
Coming. They favored social equality which denied privileges to the gentry
and aristocracy. However, the fifth monarchists were not egalitarian; they
would be the new elite. Strict discipline would be imposed by the
government which they would controi.95 In contrast to more extreme
groups, the Levellers' ideas followed a logical development of English
democratic thought.
Lilburne referred to Cromwell and other Army officers as levellers in
the respect that they, "...levelled the law and the principles of justice down to
their own selfish interests."96 In the final days before Cromwell secured
control of the nation, his actions were radical and not in keeping with the
spirit of the Civil War. The war was fought to rid the country of arbitary
91 Chritopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Doyn, (New Yort:Viking Penguin Inc.,
1985), p.l19. Some times refered to as true Levellers, the Diggers are noted for
protesting enclosures on StGeorge's hill.
95 B.S. Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, (Totowa:Rovman And LitUefield, 1972), pp.l31156.
96 Robertson, p. 3.
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rule, but the Levellers charged that Cromwell and Ireton acted without
authority in purging the Parliament and executing Charles.
By appealing to reason, and demanding that law govern the actions of
the Army, the Levellers seemed less radical than Cromwell. It is true that
the Levellers advocated changing the system of government, but they sought
authority from the people of England. At no time did they plan to
implement policy without approval. Lilburne stated the Army's position for
the purge: "For where we, say they, either law, warrant or commission to
purge it?"97 The Army maintained that they could not obtain an
endorsement from any source, and that urgency necessitated speed of action.
The Levellers disagreed with the Army's interpretation of events and
regarded Charles' execution as a logical step in the establishment of an
authoritarian government based on military rule. Lilburne refused to act as
a judge at the King's trial, because he believed the proceeding to be unjust
and not in keeping with the laws of England. Lilburne stated that the trial
was to be, "...extraordinary...(having) no real footsteps nor paths in our law,"
and to have such a trial, "...would be a thing of extraordinary ill
precedent..."98 The Levellers believed that executing the King was of little
importance; however, the manner used in dealing with Charles could set the
tone of the settlement. By treating Charles as any other man accused of a
crime, all thoughts of divine right would be crushed, and the new system of
government would be perceived as fair. Lilburne did not trust a system
which, to secure power, quickly dealt with problems out of fear, and he
maintained that the people should not accept such a system.

97 Woodhouse, liiKal FuDdameDIJIJ li!Jerlies. p. 3'i8.
98 ibid, p. 355.

33

After Charles' execution, the Levellers were not needed by the
generals. The Army's policy had been to compromise with the Levellers, but
never to cooperate. Lilburne opposed the King's execution because he
believed that a tyrant balanced the tyrannical tendencies of the Army.
Lilburne was correct with regard to his own fate. Advocating a democratic
system, based on an agreement of the people meant that the Levellers' base
of support was to be the common person. However, the mass of people had
no power to implement the Levellers' ideas. In addition to lacking the tools
and conditions necessary for the establishment democratic government, most
English people did not relate to the Levellers' concerns. Local problems and
regional alliances tended to occupy their attention.99 The Levellers
successfully appealed to the common men in the Army ranks by focusing on
issues important to the soldier. There is little evidence that the average
soldier understood the Levellers' philosophy. Lacking a solid and effective
base of support, the Levellers were victims of circumstance. When the Army
secured control of the government, Cromwell turned on Lilburne. The
Levellers gained influence as a factional group, but they could not gain
control.

99 for one example see David Underdown, "The Chalk and The Cheese: Contrasts Among
The English Clubmen," Past&Present8' (November 1979): 2,. Underdown maintains
that rural people had polical attitudes but, "...ones visible only as reactions to external
threats to the integrity of their communities."
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